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Article 
(Re)discovering Duties: 
Individual Responsibilities in the Age of Rights 
Fernando Berdion Del Valle and Kathryn Sikkink 
“There cannot be ‘innate’ rights in any other sense than 
that in which there are innate duties, of which, however, 
much less has been heard.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT HAPPENED TO DUTIES? 
Human rights are, simultaneously, legal, moral, and 
political claims.2 Equally important, however, is the fact that 
human rights are fundamentally claims about relationships.3 To 
have any practical meaning, human rights must be recognized 
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 1. See THOMAS HILL GREEN & PAUL HARRIS, LECTURES ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 28 (Paul Harris & 
John Morrow eds., 1986). 
 2. See TONY EVANS, US HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 7 (1996). 
 3. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1990); CHRISTOPHER N. J. 
ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 122 (2015); Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism as a Path Towards a 
Discursive and Open Theory of International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 663, 686–
90 (2000). 
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by states, international institutions, and society generally. 
Another way to express this basic fact is that all human rights 
imply duties.4 For many scholars, this logical relationship is so 
widely acknowledged that asserting it borders on truism.5 A 
closer look reveals that although scholars often assert the 
correlation of human rights and duties, or even call for increased 
attention to duties to fulfill human rights, the dynamics between 
contemporary human rights and “human duties” are rarely 
studied in any systematic way.6 Moreover, the now-robust 
historical literature that traces the sources and evolution of 
human rights concepts largely avoids tracing a history of duties.7 
This lack of attention is all the more remarkable if we accept the 
notion that human rights—those internationally recognized 
claims articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”) and later formalized through legal 
instruments and institutions—are, by now, a basic feature of 
international relations.8 Human rights long ago ceased to be an 
idea or even set of aspirational ideas about the dignity of 
persons; they now provide the vocabulary with which we debate 
many questions about international law, politics, and global 
justice.9 If human rights ideas have been normalized, then, how 
 
 4. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 3–5. 
 5. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 9 (3d ed. 2013). 
 6. Countless commentaries note that duties flow from human rights, but 
surprisingly few examine the sources, validity, and implications of duties of 
individuals under the international regime of human rights law as it exists 
today. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under 
Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 52 (1992); SANDRA FREDMAN, 
HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 65 
(2008). 
 7. See Samuel Moyn, Rights vs. Duties, BOSTON REV. (May 16, 2016), 
https://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/samuel-moyn-rights-duties 
(“Unfortunately, while there has been great interest in the history of rights, no 
one has attempted to write the history of human duties . . . to the best of my 
knowledge, there is not a single book on the history of duties . . . .”); Philip 
Alston, Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2043, 2043 (2013) (reviewing JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND 
THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2012) and discussing the 
historiography of human rights). But see JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 1, 241 
(1999) (discussing the drafting history of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights); ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 41–45 (examining the dramatic 
shift away from duties language evidenced in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and on the “relational” understanding of human rights). 
 8. DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
 9. See generally David Kennedy, The International Human Rights 
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is it that a fundamental part of those rights, namely duties, have 
been sidelined or even ignored? 
Today, we speak in terms of “responsibility” more often than 
“duty.” In addition, duty commonly denotes a binding legal 
obligation, while the term responsibility is more likely to be used 
in reference to social rather than legal norms.10 This distinction 
has, in part, contributed to the increased attention given to 
responsibility generally in global politics; the past twenty years, 
in particular, have seen a particularly blossoming of 
responsibilities concepts.11 Responsibility constitutes a thread 
running through a number of topical public policy subjects, 
including sovereignty-as-responsibility,12 corporate social 
responsibility,13 and common but differentiated responsibility 
within environmental policy.14 Nowhere has attention to 
responsibilities been more prominent, however, than in the 
realm of human rights protection. This “turn” to responsibility 
is evidenced in new norms such as the Responsibility to Protect 
 
Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002) (“There 
is no question that the international human rights movement has done a great 
deal of good, freeing individuals from great harm, providing an emancipatory 
vocabulary and institutional machinery for people across the globe, raising the 
standards by which governments judge one another, and by which they are 
judged, both by their own people, and by the elites we refer to collectively as the 
‘international community.’”). 
 10. For example, John Ruggie, who developed the Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights, made a conscious decision to refer to a state duty 
to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, and a corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (2013) (“My use of the 
term ‘responsibility’ was intended to signal that it differs from legal duties.”). 
See also Steven Ratner Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). 
 11. See, e.g., InterAction Council, A Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities, Art. 18 (1998), 
http://interactioncouncil.org/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities; 
INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS., TAKING DUTIES SERIOUSLY: INDIVIDUAL DUTIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMMENTARY 1 (1999), 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/10/103_report_en.pdf; Amitai Etzioni, 
Communitarianism Revisited, 19 J. POL. IDEOLOGY 241, 242 (2014); see also 
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 
(2011). 
 12. See, e.g., FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 1, 4–5 (1996). 
 13. See, e.g., Michael Posner, Business & Human Rights: A Commentary 
from the Inside, 29 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 705, 708 (2016). 
 14. See, e.g., LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7–9 (2006). 
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(R2P),15 discussions concerning businesses’ responsibility to 
respect human rights, and the emerging notion of the Right to 
Environment, which this Article explores in greater depth below. 
Even so, many of these efforts have sparked opposition among 
traditional supporters of universal human rights.16 Do these 
developments, particularly the emphasis on the role of non-state 
actors and even of individuals promoting human rights,17 
indicate an emerging Age of Responsibility in global politics?18 
Also, how do we account for this this new scholarly and policy 
interest in the responsibilities and obligations that undergird 
rights?19 Finally, how can we locate these facts within the 
broader development of political obligations—or what we might 
simply call the history of duty? 
The aim of this Article is to recover the tradition of 
individual duties that is integral to the historical origins of 
international human rights.20 We argue that increased attention 
to duties and responsibilities in international politics can be 
necessary complements to promoting human rights, particularly 
economic, social, and cultural rights. Stressing duties as useful 
complements to human rights can be a tool to address pressing 
global public policy challenges. This strategy holds particular 
promise in issue areas such as transnational environmental 
protection, and especially climate change, which traditional 
 
 15. ALEX J. BELLAMY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A DEFENSE 1 
(2015). 
 16. Amnesty Int’l & Int’l Secretariat, Muddying the Waters: The ‘Draft 
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’: No Complement to Human 
Rights, 1, 3 AI Index IOR 40/02/1998 (Mar. 31, 1998); Sue L.T. McGregor, 
Human Responsibility Movement Initiatives: A Comparative Analysis, 7 IN 
FACTIS PAX 1, 1–2 (2013). 
 17. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 1–2 (2006). 
 18. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009) 
(calling for a New Era of Responsibility). 
 19. OLUFEMI AMAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE LAW: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2011); Samantha Besson, The Bearers of Human Rights’ Duties and 
Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)evolution?, 32 SOC. POL’Y & PHIL. 
244 (2015); John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2008); Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, 
and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565 (2000); FREDMAN, supra 
note 6; WALDRON, supra note 12; Kennedy, supra note 9. 
 20. Note that in this Article the term “duty” does not primarily refer to 
binding, legal obligations. Rather, “duty” here refers to a category of concept of 
obligation which includes both binding duties as well as non-binding 
responsibilities. This choice reflects historical patterns of usage, in which the 
term duty could convey, simultaneously, legal, political and ethical meanings. 
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human rights language has struggled to address adequately.21 
To address environmental crises, it is necessary not only to 
emphasize a human right to a clean environment, but, more 
importantly, to emphasize the duty of states, corporations, and 
individuals to protect the environment.22 While much attention 
has correctly focused on the need for states and corporations to 
limit emissions to slow climate change, individuals need to 
complement state and corporate actions by working to decrease 
their own carbon footprints. Similar arguments could be made 
for a range of other pressing issues in the world, including 
inequality, refugee flows, and the right to education. To confront 
global inequality, it is necessary to stress not only the economic 
rights of individuals (e.g., to an adequate standard of living), but 
also the duties of individuals (e.g., to pay taxes so that their 
governments can address poverty and inequality at home and 
abroad).23 To address the refugee crisis in the world, we need to 
highlight not only the right to asylum, but also the duty of states 
to grant asylum and complementary responsibilities of 
individuals to help their communities receive refugees. To 
ensure that all children receive equal access to education, we 
need to stress the right to education as well as the duty of 
parents, communities, and states to create the conditions under 
which that right can be fulfilled. In sum, recovering and 
updating historical understandings about individual duties may 
provide human rights the vocabulary with which to address 
some of our most pressing collective policy concerns. Duties can 
play this vital role because, by definition, they identify the actors 
who are needed in order to make human rights real. This aspect 
of duties was recognized in 1944 when a multinational group of 
jurists and legal scholars from the American Law Institute 
(“A.L.I.”) argued that declarations of international rights 
unaccompanied by recognition of duties would make those rights 
no more than “pious aspirations.”24 
 
 21. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to 
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 106–07 (1991); Christopher Stone, 
Should Trees Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 450, 453–55 (1972). 
 22. Shelton, supra note 21; Stone, supra note 21. 
 23. We are indebted to Samuel Moyn, supra note 7, for drawing our 
attention to this duty/rights issue. 
 24. A.L.I., REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE AND STATEMENT OF 
ESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS BY A COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS REPRESENTING THE 
PRINCIPAL CULTURES OF THE WORLD 7 (Feb. 24, 1944). 
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Although duty is among the oldest topics in political 
thought, there is sparse scholarship focused specifically on 
duties in the human rights story.25 Scholars of human rights 
history have largely failed to account for the lack of explicit 
mentions of responsibilities in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.26 They have also failed to reach a consensus on 
why or how the emphasis on duties and responsibilities has 
reemerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.27 Some chalk up 
the renewed interest in the topic to the global turn to 
neoliberalism in the last thirty years, as neoliberalism places a 
greater burden on individuals to be self-reliant and productive 
(e.g., neoliberal principles might be described in terms of duties 
toward the market economy).28 Others suggest the recent call on 
duties comes from the increasing global influence of 
communitarian-minded societies, such as Singapore and China, 
where the good of the community can take priority over the 
rights of the individual.29 Intriguingly, some empirical research 
in psychology has investigated cross-cultural understanding of 
rights and duties, finding support for the notion that some basic 
principles of rights and duties exist cross-culturally, even though 
the specific scope and content of those duties vary widely across 
cultures.30 But even these investigations of notions of duties as 
 
 25. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Individual’s Duties to the 
Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 
29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Freedom 
of the Individual under Law, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983); DENG 
ET AL., supra note 12; Paust, supra note 6. 
 26. Johannes Morsink’s work is a notable exception. His definitive account 
of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a chapter 
on the debate over individual duties. However, Morsink’s text does not address 
the broader question of why duties were a prominent topic of discussion to begin 
with or what became of them after the passage of the UDHR. See MORSINK, 
supra note 7. 
 27. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 6. 
 28. MICHAEL PETERS & JAMES MARSHALL, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMUNITY: EDUCATION AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE POSTMODERN CONDITION 
63 (1996); RACHEL S. TURNER, NEO-LIBERAL IDEOLOGY: HISTORY, CONCEPTS 
AND POLICIES 4–5 (2008); Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On 
Market-Embedded Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2008). 
 29. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES 
AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA 8 (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun 
eds., 2000); Neil Mitchell et al., Liberalism, Human Rights, and Human 
Dignity, 81 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 921, 922 (1987); Amartya Sen, Human 
Rights and “Asian” Values, NEW REPUBLIC, Jul. 14 & 21, 1997, at 33 (2008). 
 30. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
AND NORMATIVE COMMENTARIES (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam 
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they exist in popular morality do little to clarify their role in the 
international human rights regime. Despite the uptick in 
attention, duties within human rights are mired in a kind of “no 
man’s land.” Recognized as an important predecessor to rights, 
their status today under international human rights law is left 
conveniently vague. The unstated consensus appears to be that 
while informal and voluntary “responsibilities” may have 
important roles to play in guaranteeing rights, “duties” per se do 
not. At best, duties seem to offer a benign, if slightly old-
fashioned, vocabulary to discuss the personal obligations 
undergirding human rights. At worst, they serve to strip rights 
of their power, offering justification for authoritarian-minded 
coercion, or providing a legal pretext with which to deny 
individuals their universal rights.31 
In contrast with this common view, our study reveals that 
the attention to duties in conjunction with rights is neither a 
new nor an intrinsic threat to human rights. In fact, duties and 
rights concepts have been linked together since the late 18th 
century, the same historical moment when phrases such as the 
Rights of Man proliferated.32 This Article traces the historical 
links between human rights and duties, describing their origins 
in the 19th and 20th century Atlantic republican tradition, and 
their growing prominence until their moment of crisis in the 
mid-20th century. In 1948, during the course of a single year, 
duties in human rights were inserted into the American 
Declaration, included prominently in draft versions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal 
 
eds., 2005). 
 31. This Article consciously employs the term “duties” rather than 
“responsibilities.” We make this choice, in part, to reflect the historical record 
of human rights discourse, where, until recently, “duties” played a much more 
prominent role than “responsibility.” In addition, “duties” language preserves 
the moral and ethical connotations that were firmly a part of human rights 
discussions in the late 1940s, and which may contribute in constructive ways to 
contemporary human rights discourse. Despite these subtle differences in 
meaning, for the purposes of this Article, the two terms can be treated as rough 
synonyms. In other words, this Article emphatically rejects the idea that the 
emerging set of voluntary “responsibilities” ought to be jettisoned and replaced 
with binding and legally enforceable “duties.” Rather, we suggest that “duties” 
under human rights were once more flexible concepts than is usually assumed, 
and that recovering this tradition of duties may complement the current push 
for responsibilities under human rights. Some also now see a link between 
responsibilities and notions of dignity. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 12. 
 32. PETER DE BOLLA, THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONCEPTS: THE HISTORICAL 
FORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77–86 (2013); DOUGLAS HODGSON, INDIVIDUAL 
DUTY WITHIN A HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 1–2 (2003). 
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Declaration” or “UDHR”), and eventually reduced to a single 
vague article (XIX) in the Universal Declaration.33 After 1948, 
duties followed a bifurcated path: international, legal human 
rights continued to downplay or omit explicit mention of duties, 
while in the sphere of regional human rights and national 
constitutions, duties persisted and even proliferated.34 But, as in 
Jorge Luis Borges’ Garden of Forking Paths, diverging tracks 
often separate and converge again, sometimes in unexpected 
ways.35 Today, duties and rights language are intersecting 
again, and in doing so, they are offering a set of conceptual tools 
that allow us to preserve the core ideas of human rights, while 
confronting transnational policy challenges. 
The argument proceeds in four parts. The first part presents 
a sketch of duties within human rights in conceptual terms. In 
particular, we note that the “rights and duties correlative” model 
does not sufficiently illustrate the meaning of the concept as it 
was first used by human rights advocates in the mid-to-late 
1940s. As a result, we present a vision of human rights duties 
understood as the necessary obligations of individuals which 
enable contemporary human rights. Building on other 
treatments of the subject, we distinguish “vertical” duties, 
directed toward coercive entities (e.g., states, churches, 
monarchs), from “horizontal” duties, which are held mutually by 
political equals (e.g., between family members, members of a 
local community, and other persons tied together by civil, 
economic, and environmental association).36 Finally, we suggest 
 
 33. MORSINK, supra note 7. 
 34. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, 
doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17 [hereinafter American Declaration]; African [Banjul] 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); 
Allen Buchanan, Why International Legal Human Rights?, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244, 244–62 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015); 
Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A 
Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 40 (2005) 
(discussing the diffusion of international human rights norms and national 
constitutional provisions). While Elkins & Simmons explore the process of 
“downward” diffusion, we suggest a potential “upwards” diffusion from national 
constitutions to the international human rights system. 
 35. JORGE LUIS BORGES, COLLECTED FICTIONS (Andrew Hurley trans., 
1998). 
 36. See Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism: A Defence, 5 CRITICAL REV. OF 
INT’L SOC. AND POL. PHIL. 86, 91 (2002); Jonathan Seglow, Associative Duties 
and Global Justice, 7 J. MORAL PHIL. 54, 54 (2010); Knox, supra note 19. 
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the need for networked rights and duties, a conceptual vision in 
which rights and duties do not exist in a dyad of individuals and 
states, or even of individuals to other individuals, but as a 
mutually reinforcing set of obligations involving a wider array of 
actors. We argue that such a networked concept of duties among 
multiple duty holders is exactly the kind of understanding 
necessary to help us address some of the pressing policy issues 
of the 21st century, such as climate change and corporate social 
responsibility. 
The second part turns to the historical origins of duties 
within human rights. This section traces how a liberal duties 
tradition gained steam slowly over the course of the long 19th 
century, eventually playing a major part in the debates leading 
up to the drafting of the UDHR in 1948. We stress that the 
linking of rights and duties is a deeply-rooted principle in the 
history of human rights—a history that cuts across the 
traditional boundaries of liberalism, conservatism, and 
communitarianism. In the process, we document the marked 
shift in the vocabulary of international human rights from ideas 
framed largely in terms of state and individual duties to free-
standing concepts grounded in beliefs about inherent human 
dignity.37 Using new archival sources, we highlight how norm 
entrepreneurs from the Global South, especially jurist-
diplomats from Latin American states, contributed to the 
coupling of rights and duties within a legal, human rights 
framework.38 These findings further reinforce earlier research, 
showing that universal human rights, sometimes thought to be 
fundamentally Western, were actually informed by a much 
broader variety of political traditions and philosophies, 
including some from the Global South.39 These traditions lent 
 
 37. JOSEPH R. SLAUGHTER, HUMAN RIGHTS, INC.: THE WORLD NOVEL, 
NARRATIVE FORM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2007); A.L.I., supra note 24. 
 38. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Latin America and the Idea of the 
International Protection of Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LATIN 
AMERICA IN THE WORLD 349, 349 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Ana Covarrabuias eds., 
2015) (“Few histories stress that Latin American states passes a similar 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man a full eight months 
before passage of the UDHR. The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of 
Man was in fact the ‘first broadly detailed enumeration of rights to be adopted 
by an intergovernmental organization.’”). 
 39. See generally Paolo Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: 
Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 281 (2003) (describing the contribution of Latin American countries to 
the genesis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Mary Ann Glendon, 
The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human 
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support to universal human rights while stressing the inherent 
social dimension of individuals; more specifically, we find that 
these Latin American norm entrepreneurs did not innovate so 
much as incorporate ideas from a bundle of related political 
traditions available to them.40 Most notably, we look to Atlantic 
republicanism,41 Catholic Social thought, 42 and Latin American 
liberalism.43 
The efforts of these legal norm entrepreneurs44 resulted in 
one of the first inter-governmental human rights agreements: 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(“American Declaration”).45 Despite this brief moment of 
ascendency for human duties, these core concepts failed to be 
incorporated into subsequent international legal human rights 
agreements (with the exception of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights, which revived the rights and duties 
model of the American Declaration).46 Given this historical 
trajectory, we approach a historical puzzle: why did 
responsibilities, obligations, and duties of individuals fail to 
 
Rights Idea, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27, 27 (2003) (characterizing the Latin 
American contribution to the development of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as “the forgotten crucible of the universal human rights idea”); 
Kathryn Sikkink, Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea 
of International Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL GOVOVERNANCE 389 (2014) 
(describing generally Latin American human rights protagonism). 
 40. See Sikkink, supra note 39, at 390; see generally Sikkink, supra note 38 
(describing the history and contributions of the Latin American human rights 
movement). 
 41. See, e.g., ERIK J. OLSEN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES OF 
DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY OF POST-SOCIALIST POLITICAL THEORY (2006); J. G. 
A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (2003). 
 42. See, e.g., Pope Leo XII, Rerum Novarum – Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo 
XIII on the Conditions of Labor (May 15, 1891), in 2 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 
1878–1903, 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981). 
 43. See, e.g., JAIME E. RODRÍGUEZ O., “WE ARE NOW THE TRUE 
SPANIARDS”:SOVEREIGNTY, REVOLUTION, INDEPENDENCE, AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF MEXICO 98 (2012) (describing the 
“determination of the people of the New World to govern themselves and to 
remain free from French domination”); Karen Racine, This England and This 
Now: British Cultural and Intellectual Influence in the Spanish American 
Independence Era, 90 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 424, 430 n.11 (2010). 
 44. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L. ORG. 887, 893–95 (1998) (calling 
attention to the evolution and influence of norms from the domestic context to 
an international stage); ROBERTS, supra note 3, 1–18 (describing the historical 
origin and trajectory of human rights). 
 45. American Declaration, supra note 34. 
 46. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 34. 
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become institutionalized in the modern human rights regime, as 
later international human rights instruments marginalized the 
concept, often condensing responsibilities and duties into a 
single, general article or a vague statement in a preamble?47 
The third part of this Article investigates the legacy of the 
“rights and duties” tradition in subsequent international 
thought by means of new empirical data. Using a contemporary 
survey of all the constitutions of the world,48 we show that where 
international agreements have failed to embrace duties 
language, national constitutions have stepped in, making duties, 
especially individual duties, a regular feature of national 
charters.49 One of the most surprising findings of this survey is 
just how pervasive duties language is: a majority (60%) of the 
world’s written constitutions contain at least one duty provision 
which applies to individuals.50 While some of these provisions, 
such as the duty to obey the constitution, are vertical and 
reinforce the power of the state, a surprising number are more 
accurately characterized as horizontal or even networked duties 
which seek to promote links between actors at various levels of 
society which, together, may help promote rights.51 
 
 47. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 29, G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 48. We conducted our own independent research, with the data and tools 
provided by the Comparative Constitutional Project (“CCP”), led by Zach 
Elkins. The CCP compiled English language versions of all the worlds’ 
constitutions, and subjected them to search and tagging tools for allow for 
comparative analysis. We created our own tagging system so we could locate, 
analyze, and compare individual duties across the world. To view CCP’s 
complete data set, see COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
For additional explanation on our use of the CCP, see discussion infra Part IV. 
 49. See, e.g., Willem van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and 
Human Rights, About Direct Obligations And the Attribution of Unlawful 
Conduct, in CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING 
BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTY-BEARER REGIME 44, 58 (Wouter 
Vandenhole ed., 2015) (“Some IFI member States have already adopted national 
human rights legislation imposing certain duties on the Executive Directors 
representing them.”); Ashfaq Khalfan & Ian Seiderman, Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Obligation: Wider Implications of the Maastricht Principles and 
the Continuing Accountability Challenge, in CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTY-
BEARER REGIME 15, 15 (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015) (discussing the 
Maastricht Principles, which “define obligations and responsibilities for the 
realization of human rights . . . “). 
 50. Data available at COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra note 
48. 
 51. We draw on the idea of vertical and horizontal duties from Professor 
John Knox. See Knox, supra note 19 (2008). 
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The final section concludes by suggesting that human duties 
can offer conceptual tools to reinforce the legitimacy of human 
rights while also addressing contemporary, transnational public 
policy challenges. We illustrate our argument in particular with 
references to the idea of a duty or responsibility to protect the 
environment that, interestingly, is the third most frequently 
mentioned duty in written constitutions today.52 More 
significantly, the duty to the environment illustrates the 
relevancy of individual duties for transnational public policy 
problems, namely, global climate change as well as the necessity 
of duties of individuals in promoting emerging rights, such as 
the Right to a Sustainable Environment.53 
Through this illustrative example, we observe that duties of 
individuals do not serve exclusively as a balance to rights; in 
some cases, the failure to acknowledge individual duties and 
responsibilities may make it impossible to enjoy a collective 
right.54 Moreover, we argue that it is useful to reexamine the 
rights and duties models outlined in regional human rights 
agreements, especially the American Declaration and the 
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (“African 
Charter”). These texts highlight the relational quality of rights 
and which already figure prominently in the rise of the Right to 
the Environment.55 These almost-forgotten histories of human 
rights and duties from the periphery can provide a bridge to 
modern debates over rights, duties, and responsibilities, thereby 
leading to the adaptation of human rights discourses in a more 
plural and multipolar world where emerging powers—such as 
Brazil, India, China, Russia, and South Africa—will increasingly 
help determine the outcome of international human rights 
debates.56 Attention to duties is also useful for efforts to gain 
 
 52. The duty or responsibility to protect is present in nearly 33% of national 
charters, making it more popular than the much-older duty to care for, raise, 
and educate children (27%). See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra 
note 48. 
 53. See generally Shelton, supra note 21 (discussing the link between 
obligations, duties, human rights, and environmental protection). 
 54. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 74–75 (2006). 
 55. See generally DONALD K. ANTON AND DINAH L. SHELTON, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 118–50 (2011) (describing 
the relationship between international human rights law and international 
environmental law). 
 56. See generally Koen De Feyter, The Common Interest in International 
Law: Implications for Human Rights, in VANDENHOLE, supra note 49, 158–87 
(describing the development of a “global common interest” and the development 
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broader support for the human rights agenda, particularly at a 
time in which the legitimacy of universal rights norms is under 
siege.57 Critiques of the contemporary human rights movement 
come in many types, but many modern criticisms argue that 
human rights ideals and institutions, while aspiring to 
universality and ethical cosmopolitanism, in reality embody the 
ideologies and interests of dominant Western powers.58 The 
potential usefulness of duties extends to societies that have 
traditionally privileged individualized negative rights against 
the state over obligations to society. In the United States, for 
example, much is made of the right to bear arms, but much less 
attention is devoted to the duties of the owners of guns to help 
diminish violence and misuse of weapons.59 With regard to 
discrimination, we need to emphasize both that individuals have 
a right not to be discriminated against and duties not to 
discriminate. 
We note at the outset that this line of argument carries risk. 
Historically, many advocates of rights have feared that too much 
emphasis on duties could undermine rights protections, and 
these concerns continue to be present in today’s debates.60 We 
need to be careful that emphasis on a duty not to discriminate 
does not undermine the right to free speech, for example. It is 
also true that many regimes with troubled records of supporting 
human rights include a particular emphasis on duties of 
 
of human rights law). 
 57. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
4, 2014, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-
against-human-rights. 
 58. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 
(2013) (“The world in which [human rights’] claim to moral authority carries 
the day is vanishing fast.”); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN HISTORY 10 (2010) (“Human rights were born as the last utopia—but one day 
another may appear.”); see also Kennedy, supra note 9. 
 59. See Christopher N. J. Roberts, Standing Our Legal Ground: Reclaiming 
the Duties Within Second Amendment Rights Cases, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 235, 256–
57 (2015) (quoting Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee 
Malcolm as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10–11, District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)) (“It seems, indeed, to be considered, 
by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only as a right, but as a duty; for all 
the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at 
all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution of 
the laws and the preservation of public peace.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Hugh Breakey, Positive Duties and Human Rights: 
Challenges, Opportunities and Conceptual Necessities, 63 POL. STUD. 1198 
(2015) (“[A]ny attempt to construct rights-based positive duties threatens to 
dissolve hallmark features of rights.”). We also thank Christopher McCrudden 
and Steven Ratner for drawing some of these risks to our attention. 
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individuals in their national constitutions, often seeking to 
balance the rights of individuals with the necessities of the state 
or of the community as mediated through the state.61 Even so, in 
the current context of strong rights protections and pressing 
global problems such as climate change, the risks of inaction or 
complacency are often more pressing than the risk of tipping the 
balance such that individual duties outweigh individual rights. 
Duties can offer a complementary vocabulary that helps 
reinforce the legitimacy and universality of human rights norms. 
With this purpose in mind, this Article makes a number of 
original contributions. To our knowledge, it represents the first 
systematic counting and categorization of duties in global 
constitutions, and it is the first scholarly work to examine the 
sources and development of the duties provisions within the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
Similarly, it is the first survey of the duties provisions in 
domestic law since the United Nations special rapporteur 
conducted an analysis of the topic in in the 1980s.62 
II. BEYOND CORRELATIVITY: NETWORKED RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES 
How should we conceive of duties? Surprisingly, no 
commonly-accepted set of categories exist in the field of 
international, legal, human rights, even though an entire branch 
of moral and ethical theory—deontology—is quite literally the 
study of duties.63 In De Officis, Marcus Tullius Cicero famously 
stressed the claims of society on the individual, “We are not born 
for ourselves alone . . . but our country claims for itself one part 
of our birth, and our friends another,”64 and defined virtue as 
fulfillment of our roles, or personae.65 Though Cicero allowed for 
the apparent conflict between the obligations arising from our 
 
 61. Some examples include Venezuela (13 individual duties), Bhutan (10 
duties), Sudan (10 duties), Zimbabwe (5 duties), and Russia (5 duties). 
 62. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Comm’n 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Individual’s 
Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms 
Under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN/4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.82.XIV.1 (1983). 
 63. “Deontological” derives from the Greek word for “duty” (δέον), and is 
defined as “the theory or study of moral obligation.” Deontology, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER (2016). 
 64. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON DUTIES 9–10, ¶ 22 (1991). 
 65. Id. at 42, ¶ 107. 
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various roles, he ultimately argued for a synthetic approach, 
believing that duties, properly understood, did not conflict with 
one another.66 Building on Cicero’s insights, the early modern 
legal theorist Samuel Pufendorf would be the first thinker to 
categorize duties in the Natural Law and arrange them in a 
systematic way. Remarkably, Pufendorf in 1691 established a 
framework that is still useful in thinking about moral duties 
today, including duties to the self, and to other humans.67 Yet, 
despite Pufendorf’s achievements in the development of a 
socially-grounded typology of duties, the arrival of Kantian 
philosophy, especially his treatment of duty as a categorical 
imperative grounded on reason itself, overshadowed and then 
eclipsed the work done by earlier Natural Law philosophers, 
much of which had been drawn from empirical observation of 
existing norms, rather than from abstract reason alone.68 While 
duties in the Kantian tradition would, of course, play a central 
role in human rights debates, the rise of the Kantian approach 
would mean a certain conceptual indeterminacy would surround 
proposed obligations under international law. 
The lack of accepted categories of duties is evidenced in the 
way in which the documents have appeared in human rights 
instruments even today. Lists of duties that appear in political 
documents like constitutions or human rights declarations do 
not attempt to neatly distinguish between duty types, often 
mixing different kinds of duties together almost haphazardly. A 
duty to obey the law, which might echo the language of Socrates 
in the Crito, may exist side by side in a national charter with a 
practical requirement to pay taxes in proportion with one’s 
income, which, in turn, may exist alongside a romantic 
exhortation that citizens must love the nation or the patria.69 In 
light of this diversity of usage, we do not attempt to create a 
comprehensive and systematic typology. Nor do we 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Pufendorf further drew contrasts between absolute and conditional 
obligations, between duties of action versus those of restraint, those engendered 
through contract and those arising out of our sociable nature as well as our 
obligation to preserve civil society generally. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 
PUFENDORF: ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 
(James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991). 
 68. See Michael Rohlf, Immanuel Kant § 5.4, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#CatImp (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
 69. For one of the earliest examples of such an amalgamation, see The 
Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy (a/k/a Cádiz Constitution), 1812 
CONST. (Spain). 
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systematically catalogue theories of political and moral duty, 
historically or within contemporary human rights thought. 
Instead, we outline a general set of meanings as a basis for our 
main project: to understand when and how duties were invoked, 
challenged, and eventually sidestepped in international legal 
human rights, while simultaneously surviving at a regional and 
national level. 
A duty is “a term loosely applied to any action or course of 
action which is regarded as morally or legally incumbent, apart 
from personal likes and dislikes.”70 A legal duty can be 
understood as “a legal obligation that is owed or due to another 
and that must be satisfied.”71 In domestic contract or tort law, a 
breach of this legal obligation results in liability; proving that a 
duty exists and then showing that it was breached “are required 
elements of any lawsuit for damages.”72 Legal advocates and 
scholars, even those working within the traditions of Anglo-
American positivism, have long understood that the existence of 
a right implies a duty to respect that right.73 Because of this 
necessary, logical relationship between rights and duties, some 
legal theorists, such as Christopher Roberts, have argued that 
rights should be viewed as not essentially about individuals, but 
about relationships between a rights-bearer and a duty-bearer.74 
This Article takes seriously Roberts’ and others’ relational 
understanding of rights and duties and seeks to understand its 
use in the politics of global human rights.75 
Duty bearers can include states, non-state actors such as 
corporations or international organizations, and individuals.76 
 
 70. DAES, supra note 62, at 38. 
 71. Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 72. Legal Duty, THE PEOPLE’S LAW DICTIONARY (2002). 
 73. See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 
175, 179 n.7 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 3, 3–4 (1993) (describing natural duties in terms of moral relation 
to the law, wherein duty, or compliance with the law, is predicated on receipt of 
benefits in return); see generally Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3 
AM. PHIL. Q. 137 (1966) (describing the ways in which duties may be thought to 
correlate with rights). 
 74. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 21. 
 75. See id.; Besson, supra note 19. The relational view is not the only 
stance, however. For other perceptions of rights beyond the relational view, see 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing that rights are “primary 
social goods”) and RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) 
(arguing for “rights as trumps”). 
 76. See, e.g., Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (delineating 
alternate forms of duty, including contractual duty, duty to act, duty to defend, 
etc.) In international law we often refer to the responsibility to protect, which 
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Most often in the human rights context, the state is portrayed as 
the primary and often exclusive duty holder.77 A right to free 
expression, therefore, implies a state duty to refrain from undue 
censorship, and to create the conditions under which people may 
express themselves freely.78 This logic applies even more directly 
in the case of a positive right, such as the right to education. In 
order for this right to be realized in practical terms, the state 
must take steps to make education possible, usually by 
establishing schools and mandating schooling for all children 
and adolescents. The human rights regime largely relies on this 
state-centered model of individual rights.79 
While the duties/rights relationships between the individual 
and the state dyad is essential, it does not cover a range of 
supplemental relationships in which individuals are both the 
rights-bearers and the duty-holders; that is, where a 
duties/rights relationship exists among individuals. Below we 
sketch out a pragmatic approach to duties—one of which opens 
the possibility of enumerated duties of individual citizens as a 
complement to and as a means of realizing rights—a networked 
model of duties. This approach rests largely on distinguishing 
between the types of duty-holders (states or individuals) and the 
types of relationships between rights-holders and duty-holders 
(vertical or horizontal) while also recognizing that some rights 
require multiple, overlapping layers of duty relationships to 
exist at once in order for the right to become realized. 
Duties in the relational sense fall into two overarching 
types: vertical and horizontal. Vertical duties include those of 
individuals toward the state, such as the duty to obey the laws, 
the duty to serve in the military, or the duty to defend the state 
in case of a national emergency. Horizontal duties are 
obligations held by individuals towards other members of one’s 
family, community, or society.80 These would include, for 
example, duties of parents to care for and educate their children 
or the responsibilities to respect the rights of others.81 
 
primarily falls on the state. See The Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2016). 
 77. DAES, supra note 62, at 39–40, ¶ 103. 
 78. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: 
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
 79. DAES, supra note 62, at 39–40, ¶ 103. 
 80. See Knox, supra note 19; see also Waldron, supra note 12. 
 81. See, e.g., American Declaration, supra note 34, art. XXIX, XXX; African 
[Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights , supra note 34, art. 27–29. 
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In addition to these horizontal and vertical obligations, 
constitutions and human rights documents refer to duties in 
which the rights-holder and the duty-holder are one and the 
same. For example, the American Declaration includes the duty 
to acquire education at least at the primary level.82 Here there 
is neither a vertical nor a horizontal relationship, but an 
inherent or internal one—a duty to self—where the individual 
possessing the right to education also has a duty to acquire that 
education.83 The same is the case with the duty to vote, which 
appears in some constitutions as well as in the American 
Declaration; the same individual who has the right to vote has 
the duty to exercise that right.84 The individual’s ability to carry 
out the duty depends on the primary duty of the state to hold 
elections and to facilitate voting, but there is nevertheless a 
supplementary duty of the individual to vote. 
This understanding of duties demonstrates that the 
relationship between rights and duties is not necessarily always 
a dyad between the state and the individual, but involves 
supplementary and complementary relationships among 
multiple actors. While a dyad model focused on the individual 
and the state evokes ideas of a link or a tether between two 
entities, the rights and duties model is more accurately 
represented by a network of diverse actors with mutually 
coexisting and potentially complementary ties.85 In the case of 
the duty or responsibility to protect the environment, this 
network of duty-holders is particularly important. In order for 
the state to meet its responsibility to protect the environment, it 
is essential that corporations and individuals fulfill their 
complementary or supplementary responsibilities. If individuals 
do not work to reduce their own carbon footprint, for instance, it 
will be very difficult for the United States to meet its emission 
goals. Simultaneously, the state needs to do more to create the 
right incentives for individuals and corporations to make 
responsible choices, including increasing gasoline taxes and 
vehicle emission standards, and corporations and individuals 
 
 82. American Declaration, supra note 34, art. XXXI. 
 83. What we call an “inherent” or “internal” relationship between rights 
and duties is similar to what Jeremy Waldron has referred to as “rights as 
responsibilities” or “responsibility-rights. Waldron, supra, note 12. We prefer to 
think of them as still two separate issues, one about rights and one about 
responsibilities because an individual still holds these rights even if he or she 
does not engage in the responsibility to exercise them. 
 84. Id. art. XXXII. 
 85. DE BOLLA, supra note 32, 74 & n.67. 
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must exercise their supplementary responsibilities and duties. 
These various types of relationships among rights-holders and 
duty-bearers are illustrated below. 
Types of Rights/Duties or Rights/Responsibilities 
Relationships:86 
Rights and Duties Embedded in Vertical 
Relationships: 
 
 
 
Rights and Duties Embedded in Horizontal 
Relationships: 
 
 
 86. All examples of duties are taken from the American Declaration, supra 
note 34, and the African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra 
note 34. 
 
State 
Individual 
Society 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
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Duties to Self: 
 
 
 
Networked Rights and Duties: 
 
In the contemporary understanding of human rights, duties 
are both under- and over-accepted. It is taken for granted in 
much of day-to-day life, particularly when we enter into 
contracts. When we create a social media account, we commonly 
agree to a statement of rights and responsibilities which places 
binding obligations on us in exchange for that particular 
software or technological platform, and when we sign a lease for 
an apartment, we frequently agree to an enumerated list of 
rights and obligations as tenants. Yet, despite our acceptance of 
the rights and duties model generally, Anglo-American liberal 
tradition has been remarkably reticent to incorporate a similar 
idea into our understanding of political rights. The English Bill 
of Rights established this tradition with its focus on rights and 
Networked 
Right
Individual 
duty 
State duty
Corporate 
responsibility
Individual 
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liberties, while the American Bill of Rights reaffirmed it with its 
unequivocal focus on individual rights against the state.87 
Rights, in this tradition are thought to exist either on their own, 
or as properties of particular legal actors. 
The United States, despite its debts to civic republicanism, 
has never included a duty to vote; instead it appears that 
individuals have a right to vote and a right not to vote.88 Nor is 
there a movement underway to amend our constitution to 
include a duty to protect the environment. Many other countries 
in the world have been more open to the idea of individual duties, 
including a duty to protect the environment.89 Today, over 60% 
of all national constitutions feature at least one duty or 
responsibility of the individual.90 It is particularly important to 
clarify that the divisions we find on duties in constitutions are 
not between the Global North and the Global South, or between 
“the West and the rest.” As our empirical studies show, the 
pattern of adoption across national constitutions has been more 
nuanced than this. The strongest attention to duties has been in 
Latin America, while the weakest is in the much smaller group 
of countries that were former British colonies.91 African nations 
have been avid adopters of individual duties, although not 
uniformly so.92 In Asia, only some nations, such as Bhutan, have 
a robust system of duties.93 Constitutions that include a duty to 
protect the environment are equally well-distributed around the 
world.94 
 
 87. The Bill of Rights of 1689: An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of 
the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown, Parliamentary Archives, 
HL/PO/PU/1/1688/1W&Ms2n2 (Dec. 1689). 
 88. Gordon Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 
66 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 13, 23 (1990). 
 89. See BINOD PRASAD SHARMA, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION: A STUDY 3–7 (Sept. 2010), https://cmsdata.
iucn.org/downloads/constitutional_provisions_related_to_environment_conserv
ation___final.pdf. 
 90. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 2008 CONST. art. 5 ¶ 1, art. 8 ¶¶ 2, 9–11 (Bhu.). 
 93. Compare 1995 CONST. art. XXIX (Ghana), with 2010 CONST. (Malawi). 
 94. See SHARMA, supra note 89, at 3–7. 
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III. 1948: DUTIES IN CRISIS 
A. ORIGINS: 1795 - 1917 
The first modern constitution connecting rights and duties 
of individuals arrived with France’s Constitution of the Year III 
(1795).95 The Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and 
Citizen in this constitution included many of the rights from the 
original Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen from 1789, but 
it also included nine articles listing duties of individuals, 
containing, most importantly, the duty to respect the laws, 
mentioned four times in the nine articles. The list also 
establishes horizontal duties such as being a “good son, good 
father, good brother, good friend, and good husband.”96 Historian 
Andrew Jainchill, author of the most recent scholarship on the 
Constitution of the Year III, rejects the long-held notion that the 
constitution was a Catholic or conservative reactionary 
document against the excesses of the Jacobin Terror, which is 
also known as the Thermidorian reaction.97 Jainchill shows, 
instead, that by 1795, the Thermidorian reaction98 had run out 
of steam; the authors of the Constitution of the Year III were 
Republicans who wanted to reclaim the revolution from its most 
extreme and violent elements and reestablish order. They wrote 
a constitution that featured the ideas of civic Republicanism 
emphasizing civic virtue for public officials in particular.99 This 
constitution featured duties language as a bulwark against 
public corruption, rather than as a precondition for the exercise 
of rights, or as a well-developed outline of political obligation 
under the new regime. 
Interestingly, even this initial foray into duties languages 
engendered discussion on a topic which would haunt duties for 
decades to come: the workability of enumerated duties as a 
technical matter of law. In 1799, Pierre-Claude Laroche, a 
Parisian legal scholar and public notary, explored the 
 
 95. 1795 CONST. (Fr.). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See ANDREW JAINCHILL, REIMAGINING POLITICS AFTER THE TERROR: 
THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF FRENCH LIBERALISM 26–27 (2008). 
 98. Id. at 27. The Thermidorian Reaction, named after the revolutionary 
calendar month of Thermidor in which it occurred, displaced Robespierre and 
the Committee of Public Safety from power, thus ending the period of civil 
violence known as “the Terror.” 
 99. JAINCHILL, supra note 97, at 31. 
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relationship between rights and duties in the short-lived French 
charter, offering his interpretation on the legal implications of 
explicitly enumerated obligations.100 Laroche makes clear in his 
gloss that duties in the Constitution of the Year II did not spark 
controversy because of questions of the appropriateness of duties 
per se.101 In fact, Laroche viewed duties as prior to rights, and as 
the necessary condition arising out of the natural sociability of 
man first described by Aristotle.102 Instead, Laroche’s 
commentary displayed the concerns with the lack of analytical 
rigor in the declaration of rights and duties.103 Why, Laroche 
wondered, do we need to “declare” rights and duties rather than 
derive them naturally from principles of human nature? Why, 
also, did the French charter employ both “duties” (devoir) and 
“obligation” (obligation) when the former would imply the latter? 
Why were civil duties yoked to moral platitudes about the 
Golden Rule and the virtues of filial piety? In raising these 
various critiques, Laroche pinpointed one of the primary 
weaknesses of duties discourse, namely, its lack of widely 
accepted philosophical foundations and analytical boundaries.104 
This indeterminacy meant that duties declarations, such as in 
the Constitution of the Year III, risked devolving into a kind of 
litany of moral banalities which detract from the conceptual 
clarity of the rights they accompanied. 
The similarly short-lived Spanish Constitution of 1812 (also 
known as the Cádiz Constitution) was the first constitution in 
the Hispanic world to feature duties alongside rights.105 The 
constitution was also remarkable because Creole delegates from 
colonial Latin America participated on equal footing with their 
Spanish counterparts in the drafting process, resulting in a 
charter which allowed for surprising autonomy among Spain’s 
Latin American colonies.106 The document seeks to balance 
newly established individual rights with traditional deference to 
society and the state and the nation of Spaniards.107 Although 
short-lived as a working political charter, the Constitution of 
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1812 proved to be a foundational text in Ibero-American 
liberalism, and influenced generations of Latin America’s 
national constitutions.108 Thus, when Latin American countries 
later secured their independence from Spain in the early 1800s, 
they were able to draw from the Cádiz Charter for their new 
constitutions, combining protection of rights with individual 
duties to state, society, and the family.109 
In the Americas, duties re-emerged most prominently in the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917.110 Some of these are individual 
vertical duties of Mexican citizens to receive military training, 
but the constitution also included horizontal duties, such as, for 
example, the duty to educate one’s children. The Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 was the forerunner of all the following 
Latin American constitutions of the twentieth century.111 
Although much work on the Mexican Constitution stresses its 
emphasis on workers’ rights and the expropriation and 
redistribution of land, it is equally notable for its attention to the 
civil and political rights and duties of the individual, motivated 
in large part by a humanist concern for the condition of the 
common people and informed again by Catholic social doctrine, 
despite the anti-clerical nature of the revolution.112 The Mexican 
Constitution highlights the right to education in its long and 
detailed third article.113 In Article 31 detailing “the obligations 
of Mexicans,” the first obligation requires parents to send 
children to school.114 Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution also 
includes the right to health, and adds that it is a duty of parents 
to preserve the mental and physical health of their children.115 
The detailed section on labor laws and social security spells out 
the responsibilities that employers have to provide a series of 
health benefits, including special maternity benefits.116 Here, we 
find a very early statement of the responsibility of businesses to 
respect rights.117 Following Mexico’s example, most countries in 
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the region began to include lists of rights and duties in their 
respective constitutions, a trend that continues to this day.118 
Moreover, as we shall see below, the duties in the Mexican 
Constitution influenced in turn the duties section of American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
B. DUTIES IN 20TH CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
The earliest proposals for international human rights 
documents placed as much emphasis on spelling out duties as 
they did on spelling out rights. They relied upon the state duty 
model that represented the primary frame through which 
European jurists viewed the concept of individual rights since 
the Enlightenment.119 This was particularly true in the 
codification of Inter-American norms of international law. In 
1929, the American Institute of International Law, a group of 
legal scholars and diplomats with members from the United 
States and Latin America, published one of the first-ever 
universal rights documents: the “Declaration of the 
International Rights of Man,” inspired by the work of pioneering 
Russian jurist and diplomat André Mandelstam.120 The first 
three articles of this declaration specified the duties of states to 
protect their citizens’ rights of life, liberty, property, religious 
freedom, and language.121 Even though the American Institute 
of International Law made bold claims about universal rights in 
the 1929 Declaration, its formulation of state duties followed 
earlier models, most notably the American Institute of 
International Law’s “Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Nations,” published in 1916.122 The A.L.I. clarified that they 
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believed rights were “pious aspirations” unless accompanied by 
clear statements of state duties.123 
In 1944, on the eve of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement and 
the genesis of the United Nations system, the A.L.I. gathered to 
identify a common standard of “essential human rights.”124 
Originally conceived as a kind of multi-cultural audit of already 
existing basic rights, it eventually grew in scope and served as a 
key model for the drafters of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.125 Their final product, “Report to the Council of 
the Institute and Statement of Essential Human Rights by a 
Committee of Advisers, Representing the Principle Cultures of 
the World,” frames each individual right in terms of not only the 
individual rights-bearer’s substantive liberty or entitlement, but 
also the state’s duty to protect that right.126 In the Report to 
Accompany the Definitive Draft Declaration of the International 
Rights and Duties of Man, the first article provides: “Each State 
has a duty to recognize the equal rights of every individual to 
life, liberty, and property and to accord to all within its territory 
to the full and entire protection of this right without distinction 
as to nationality, sex, race, language or religion.”127 The 
inclusion of the explicit language about the duties of states, 
along with a justification for them, tends to undercut the 
argument that duties have traditionally been conceived of as the 
“the shadows” cast by human rights—concepts that exist, to be 
sure, but only insofar as they mirror the more robust and 
meaningful rights of individuals. Nevertheless, the document 
makes it clear that talks of universal rights defaulted to a 
discussion of state responsibility. 
The A.L.I. recognized that the precision with which state 
duties are enumerated is itself a highly contested political issue. 
In response, it proposed a framework to guide the precision of 
state duties: that the specificity of state duties depends on the 
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nature of the right affirmed.128 With regard to the right of 
religion, for example, the state’s duties are presented in both 
their negative form (“refrain from arbitrary limitation”) as well 
as their positive, or active, form (“prevent denial of reasonable 
access”).129 The statement also refers to duties of individuals in 
an explanatory note: “We have likewise borne in mind that each 
right involves positive and negative duties on the part of the 
individual. We have emphasized this basic fact in the Preamble 
and in Article 18.”130 The focus on the role of the state as a main 
duty-bearer is congruent with the framing of other draft 
international agreements from this period.131 
C. 1948: THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF MAN 
The American Declaration was both the first 
intergovernmental declaration on human rights and the first 
international declaration that simultaneously presented articles 
on individual rights and duties.132 The text contains twenty-
eight articles on rights, civil and political as well as economic 
and social, and ten articles on duties. The American Declaration 
was first approved at the Ninth International Conference of 
American States in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 1948. The 
Organization of American States (“OAS”) did not yet exist at the 
time of the Bogotá meeting; in fact, the OAS Charter was 
finalized and signed at Bogotá alongside the American 
Declaration.133 
The American Declaration is also significant because of its 
influence on the content of the UDHR.134 Although both 
declarations were being drafted in the same period, from 1946-
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1948, the drafting of the American Declaration started before 
the process of drafting the UDHR and was ahead of it at every 
point. In 1945, when representatives from the countries of Latin 
America and the United States met at the Chapultepec 
Conference in Mexico City to discuss the proposed post-war 
economic and political order in preparation for the San Francisco 
Conference to draft the UN Charter, the delegates decided to 
draft an international bill of rights.135 The delegates asked the 
Inter-American Juridical Committee (“IAJC”), which served as 
the legal advisory body to the Pan-American Union, to prepare 
a preliminary draft of the declaration.136 By 1946, before the first 
meeting of the committee that was to draft the UDHR, the IAJC 
had produced the “Draft Declaration of the International Rights 
and Duties of Man” as well as an accompanying report.137 
Here, we reach the first of our puzzles about why duties are 
missing in international human rights law. The draft version of 
the document provided the basis for the final declaration, but it 
included a more detailed and specific articulation of state duties 
than the final text that was ultimately approved at Bogotá.138 
State delegates eventually removed all of these specific 
discussions of state duties in the American Declaration.139 Why 
did the final text of the American Declaration not include 
detailed articulation of duties that were in the draft versions? 
Although definitive explanations are difficult to pin down in the 
archival record, there is evidence to believe that states did not 
want to have such detailed discussions of state duties in order to 
avoid potential future liability. Even states that supported 
rights declarations preferred to leave duties provisions 
conveniently vague, limiting their legal responsibility in the case 
of non-compliance.140 
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Some of the proposals for duties in the American 
Declaration did include more detailed and robust obligations of 
the state. For instance, the Panamanians proposed a draft that 
included detailed discussion of state duties. In the Panamanian 
draft, for example, the right to property amounts to only eight 
words—”Every person has the right to own property”—but the 
following paragraph went into greater detail about state duties 
to facilitate that right, specifying that “[t]he state has the duty 
to cooperate in assisting the individual to attain a minimum 
standard of private ownership of property based upon the 
essential material needs of a decent life, looking to the 
maintenance of the dignity of the human person and the sanctity 
of human life.”141 At the Bogotá conference, the delegates of the 
drafting committee were careful to omit all specific discussion of 
the duties of states and also all of the articles on individual 
duties. Panama argued for even more detailed state obligations, 
but other states demurred, noting concerns about the differing 
levels of resources and industrialization among member states. 
Other reasons for deleting state duties revolved around issues of 
consistency and duties as a legal term of art (in this the delegates 
at Bogotá echoed some of the same concerns expressed by Pierre 
Laroche a century and a half before). According to a legal expert 
tasked with reconciling the drafts produced by the working 
group, the “detailed and almost exhaustive” list of state duties 
was excised because “on one hand, that [the state duties] would 
move the text away from its mandate, and, on the other hand, 
that they would detract from the power of expression and the 
clarity of the Declaration.”142 Was this decision driven by desire 
for clarity, or were national delegations reluctant to endorse 
such specific obligations for their respective governments even 
in a non-binding declaration? At the same time the delegates in 
Bogotá were removing statements about state duties, they were 
adding and refining articles on the duties of individuals. In some 
cases, these duties of individuals complemented the primary 
duties of states, but in others, the rhetoric of individual 
obligation seemed to supplant that of state duty. In the end, a 
hybrid model emerged, which reflected Latin America’s concern 
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for sovereignty on the one hand and social economic and cultural 
rights on the other hand—a political bundle known as the 
“sovereignty-social rights complex.”143 The ten individual duties 
in the American Declaration include duties toward children and 
parents, to receive instruction, vote, obey the law, serve the 
community and the nation, cooperate with the state and the 
community with respect to social security and welfare, pay 
taxes, work, and refrain from political activities in a foreign 
country. 
An exploration of diverse philosophical origins, which 
informed the work of the delegates at Bogotá, may help explain 
the broad support for placing individual duties in the American 
Declaration. The Mexican delegate to Bogotá, Antonio Gómez 
Robledo, representing a government with strict separation of 
Church and State, was deeply involved in advocating for the 
concept of individual duties, as was the Guatemalan delegate, 
representing the leftist government of Juan José Arévalo. The 
Guatemalan delegation also advocated for the inclusion of some 
of the rights and duties from the Guatemalan Constitution, 
written only a few years previously in 1945. The Guatemalans 
justified the attention to both rights and duties, noting that 
“developing countries needed to address the unique 
socioeconomic challenges regarding human rights initiatives 
that vastly differed from prosperous industrialized nations.”144 
In this, the Guatemalan delegation alluded to concerns about the 
capabilities of weak states in promoting human rights.145 
The particular language pertaining to duties in the 
American Declaration was crafted by a working group of several 
countries, but the primary author was Mexican diplomat 
Germán Fernández del Castillo. In a memorandum debriefing 
the events at Bogotá, Fernández del Castillo cites the Mexican 
Constitution as one of the three main sources for the duties.146 
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Once the language came to the General Assembly at the Bogotá 
meeting for debate, the Colombian Delegation proposed 
including three additional individual duties. These obligations 
emphasize the spiritual dimension of political obligation, and 
once again allude to the effective goals of the Constitution of the 
Year III and the Cádiz Constitution. These additional 
obligations include: Duty to the Spirit (Deber ante el Espíritu), 
Duty to Culture (Deber de Cultura), and Duty to Morals and 
Morality (Deber de Moralidad y Buenas Maneras). Although 
these duties were not adopted as their own articles, they did 
succeed by being incorporated into the Preamble of the American 
Declaration. It reads: “The fulfillment of duty by each individual 
is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are 
interrelated in every social and political activity of man. While 
rights exalt individual liberty, duties express the dignity of that 
liberty.”147 The historical records note that these measures were 
“effusively adopted” by the working group on duties, as long as 
it was made clear that these “moral” responsibilities were 
distinct from the legal ones mentioned elsewhere in the 
document.148 The American Declaration, therefore, represented 
an agglomeration of duties traditions. Republican ideas about 
civic virtue fused with local understandings of rights which were 
already present in many of the region’s national charters.149 This 
process is what one scholar has called “Inter-American 
Constitutionalism,” or the interaction between human rights 
developments and progressive constitutional developments in 
the region.150 The idea of human rights and duties was not a 
recent legal transplant in the region, but a long nourished and 
cultivated local aspiration.151 These local aspirations reflected 
the region’s particular understanding of the relationship 
between sovereignty on the one hand, and social rights on 
another, and a general culture that was quite receptive to 
legalism in international relations, a mix of political and 
philosophical traditions that has been aptly named the 
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“sovereignty-rights complex,” and which has proven deeply 
influential in global understanding of human rights.152 
D. 1948: THE MISSING DUTIES IN THE UDHR 
None of the individual duties in the American Declaration 
survived to be incorporated in the final version of the Universal 
Declaration. The final draft of the UDHR mentions duties only 
in a general sense as illustrated in Article 29: “Everyone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.”153 But the earliest 
draft of the UDHR—also called the Secretariat Draft or 
Secretariat Outline, written by John Humphrey, head of the 
Human Rights Division of the UN Secretariat—mentions duties 
multiple times, including individual duties both to the state and 
to the United Nations in the most prominent section of the 
document: “Article 1: Every one owes a duty of loyalty to his 
State and to the (international society) United Nations. He must 
accept his just share of responsibility for the performance of such 
social duties and his share of such common sacrifices as may 
contribute to the common good.”154 In addition to this Article, 
duties are mentioned eight more times, including state and 
individual duties and vertical and horizontal duties. As it 
regards individuals, the draft declaration includes duties to 
“present information and news in a fair and impartial 
manner,”155 and to “perform socially useful work,”156 and states 
that an individual’s “right to a livelihood is conditioned by his 
duty to work.”157 
In drafting the Secretariat Outline, Humphrey drew on 
many sources, making it difficult to pinpoint his motivations for 
including duties in his draft. Still, in later memoirs, Humphrey 
points to the submission of the A.L.I. (heavily contributed to and 
backed by Panama’s Ricardo Alfaro) as “[t]he best of the texts 
from which I worked . . . I borrowed freely from it.”158 His 
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reliance on Panama is most clear in Article 2 of the Secretariat 
Draft, which functions in tandem with the social responsibility 
and duties laid out in Article 1. This Article was lifted almost 
verbatim from the Panamanian constitution, which states that 
“[i]n the exercise of his rights every one [sic] is limited by the 
rights of others and by the just requirements of the democratic 
state”; the only difference is that in Article 2, the word 
“democratic” is removed and the phrase “and of the United 
Nations” is added to the end.159 The influence of Panama on the 
Secretariat Draft suggests that the broader influence of Latin 
American thought in the evolution and inclusion of the concept 
of duties in international human rights agreements. 
The United Kingdom, the United States, and France all 
responded to the Secretariat Draft with their own versions of a 
declaration of rights, including new proposed articles and 
revised versions of existing articles. By exploring what was 
included and excluded in these drafts, we can see the reactions 
of some major powers to the duties sections of the Secretariat 
Draft. The United Kingdom draft mentions duties only twice, 
instead of ten times, and both times are in the preamble rather 
than in the text itself.160 The first mention acknowledges that 
individuals have a “duty to respect the rights of their fellow 
man,” while the second is more of a limitation on the notion of 
duties than an endorsement of it: “Whereas the just claims of the 
state, which all men are under a duty to accept, must not 
prejudice the respect of man’s right to freedom and equality 
before law and the safeguard of human rights . . . .”161 It seems 
that the United Kingdom government feared that the insistence 
on duties might be used later to undermine the respect for rights. 
The American document is not a full draft of a human rights 
declaration, as are the United Kingdom and French drafts, but 
rather suggestions for articles to be incorporated. Even so, the 
United States draft does not mention duties, and endorses in its 
first suggested article a new version of Article 3 of the 
Secretariat draft that says: “In the exercise of his rights, 
everyone is limited by the rights of others.”162 As opposed to the 
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rights and duties tradition in Latin America, here, we see what 
we might call the rights vs. rights tradition more characteristic 
of the Anglo-American thought, where individual rights are 
limited only by rights or others, and are not explicitly connected 
to others through an individual duty to respect their rights. 
Finally, although the French version both retains and 
expands upon some of the duties language of the Secretariat 
draft, it also condenses multiple articles on duties. Most 
interesting is the longer French version of Article 3 of the 
Secretariat draft, which reads: “As human beings cannot live 
and achieve their objects without the help and support of society, 
each man owes to society fundamental duties which are: 
obedience to law, exercise of useful activity, acceptance of the 
burdens and sacrifices demanded for the common good.”163 Later 
in the French version, the idea appears again that individuals 
have both a “right and a duty to do work useful to society and to 
develop their personalities fully.”164 In its insistence on 
obedience to law, this French draft echoes some of the language 
in the French Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and 
Citizens of 1795. This juxtaposition of French support for duties, 
and United States and United Kingdom avoidance of them 
shows that the difference on duties were not between countries 
of the global north and the global south, but between an Anglo-
American approach to rights that was skeptical of duties versus 
the rest. In the context of the post-WWII international order, 
however, the position of the United States and the United 
Kingdom carried unusual weight. 
At some points, the United States and United Kingdom 
position received strong support from delegates from the Global 
South. Charles Malik of Lebanon spoke at length about Articles 
1 and 2 of the Secretariat Draft, and it is worth quoting to 
illustrate a quite fierce objection to duties from one of the key 
framers of the UDHR: 
Speaking with respect to Articles 1 and 2, Dr. Malik 
(Lebanon) questioned why they should be called 
‘preliminary,’ and placed at the very beginning of the 
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Secretariat draft outline. Both of them, he said, would 
limit the freedom of the individual if they were adapted 
in their present form. In his opinion, any social pressure 
placed upon the individual by a Bill of Rights should be 
balanced by a statement of what society owes the 
individual. He characterized as ‘astounding’ the 
statement in the Secretariat outline: ‘Every one owes a 
duty to his State’ and pointed out that it might be 
questioned whether an individual owed such a duty of 
loyalty regardless of the characteristics of his State. In 
considering a Bill of Rights, he went on, it was odd that 
men ought first be told that their freedom is limited. If 
this were done it would be a Bill not of Human Rights 
but of what man owes society. It was precisely because 
the balance had been tipped against the individual and 
in favor of society that human rights had been violated. 
He concluded by saying that Article 1 of the Secretariat 
draft was to him objectionable and should not be 
included; or if included should be reworded; and that 
Article 2 should not appear at the beginning of the Bill of 
Rights.165  
A representative from the United Kingdom supported 
Malik’s point of view, stating that he thought that the article on 
duties “should be omitted from the Bill but that the substantive 
idea might be included somewhere in the preamble.”166 Similar 
opposition to these articles came from the representatives from 
the Philippines and from China, who suggested that in dealing 
with a declaration on human rights, “the rights of the individual 
should be stressed before his duties to society.”167 The main 
delegate from the United States, and the chair of the UDHR 
drafting committee, Eleanor Roosevelt, agreed that “the article 
regarding the general limitations on the enjoyment of rights 
would be better placed towards the end of the Declaration.”168 
Following these initial complaints, delegates continued to cut 
back on duties until they almost disappeared from the 
Secretariat Draft. 
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When the drafting process opened up to all member states 
of the United Nations in the later months of 1948, the Latin 
American delegates worked to reinsert references to duties into 
the UDHR. The Cuban delegate Pérez Cisneros pushed this 
firmly. Cisneros explained, “the individual should also be 
reminded that he was a member of society and that he must 
affirm his right to be a human being by clearly recognizing the 
duties which were corollaries of his rights.”169 The Brazilian 
delegate similarly argued that it was “impossible to draw up a 
declaration of rights without proclaiming the duties implicit in 
the concept of freedom . . . .”170 Without the concept of duties, he 
said, “freedom might lead to anarchy and tyranny.”171 Here, 
Brazil and Cuba spoke for the majority of Latin American states 
that had worked to get individual duties into the American 
Declaration. 
The Latin American delegates failed to obtain a detailed list 
of duties in the Universal Declaration; they had to settle for the 
single line in Article 29 mentioning duties. Nevertheless, in the 
wording of that line, some believed they secured a victory for a 
more communitarian vision. The line reads: “Everyone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.”172 The victory came 
with the word “alone,” which in their mind recognized that 
community was necessary to the enjoyment of rights and that 
duties were essential to the protection of that community.173 The 
exact reasons for the rejection of duties language by other 
delegates are not completely clear. In his memoirs, when 
discussing this final period of drafting the UDHR, John 
Humphrey mentioned the “Bogotá menace,” his term for the 
efforts of Latin American delegates to try to get the entire 
content of the American Declaration into the UDHR.174 Since we 
know that Humphrey included duties in his Secretariat Draft, 
we can conclude that his “Bogotá menace” was not the inclusion 
of duties per se, but the delay that would be caused to the 
consideration of the UDHR if Latin Americans insisted on 
debating each of the ten articles on duties in the America 
Declaration as they had appeared in the regional declaration. 
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Such a debate may have been perceived as threatening to the 
timely completion of the UDHR. 
The failure to include any detailed discussion of duties in 
the UDHR created a path-dependent situation where virtually 
all subsequent human rights treaties also failed to mention 
specific duties beyond a general statement in a single article.175 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) as well as the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) do not contain references 
to specific individual duties in the body of the treaty, although 
they include a statement on duties in their preambles: 
“Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals 
and to the community to which he belongs, is under a 
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”176 In these later 
binding human rights agreements, duties were implied, but not 
explicitly stated. As a result, over the next several decades the 
idea that an explicit and robust set of duties should naturally 
accompany rights all but disappeared from the content of 
international human rights law. The continuous failure to 
include references to specific duties in later international human 
rights documents, however, meant that rights came to be 
understood as attributes of the individual rather than as 
constitutive of a relationship between a rights-holder and a 
duty-holder.177 
Particularly puzzling is the absence of duties in the 
American Convention of Human Rights of 1969. The initial draft 
of the American Convention prepared by the Inter-American 
Council of Jurists did not contain any mention of the individual 
duties that figure so prominently in the American Declaration, 
nor did delegates add duties during the drafting process.178 This 
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demonstrates the path-dependent nature of the drafting of 
human rights treaties. After duties language was explicitly 
excluded from the UDHR, it was not reinserted in any human 
rights treaty, with the single exception of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights.179 
E. DUTIES AND THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
The only major exception to this abrupt turn to exclude 
duties in human rights treaties was the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was drafted in 1979 and 
entered into force in 1986.180 The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter) has received 
attention for including both individual rights and collective 
(Peoples’) rights in the document, especially the right to self-
determination.181 Less attention has been directed toward the 
innovative way it addresses duties and the fact that it is the only 
human rights treaty to do so with any degree of specificity.182 
The preamble to the African Charter recognizes “that the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance 
of duties on the part of everyone,”183 and Articles 27–29 of the 
Charter contain specific duties of individuals.184 Part I of the 
Charter is labeled “Rights and Duties”; Chapter 1 handles rights 
while Chapter 2 handles individual duties.185 In the discussion 
of rights, the Charter makes various references to the duties of 
States to promote rights.186 Chapter 2, Article 27, paragraph 1 
of the Charter states that, “[e]very individual shall have duties 
towards his family and society, the State and other legally 
recognized communities and the international community.”187 
This language echoes the Secretariat Draft’s discussion of 
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international duties, but is the first time a human rights treaty 
includes duties that extend to the international community. 
In a region often characterized as more communitarian, it is 
interesting to see this cosmopolitan understanding of duties. 
Article 28 of the Banjul Charter then proclaims the duty to 
respect others, and “to maintain relations aimed at promoting, 
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.”188 
Finally, Article 29 lists nine specific individual duties, including 
the duty to the family and to parents in particular, the duty to 
serve the national community and national independence, the 
duty to work and pay taxes, and the duty to preserve African 
cultural values and to promote African unity.189 In the duties to 
promote African unity, we see the lingering effect of the Pan-
African movement as duties expand to include the regional 
community.190 Yet, when the African Charter turns in Part II to 
“measures of safeguard,” the main institution to enforce the 
Charter, the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, is only given the task of promoting and ensuring the 
protection of rights, with no mention of the possibility of 
promoting duties.191 This suggests that once again, the belief 
that it is more difficult or problematic to enforce duties may have 
complicated the inclusion of duties in human rights documents. 
Around the same time as the African Charter was being 
drafted, the United Nations commissioned a survey in 1976 to 
study the status of duties of the individual to the community 
under international law.192 To research the question, the Special 
Rapporteur asked Member States to respond to a survey to 
articulate their nations’ stances toward the individual’s duties 
to the community, both in international law and under their 
domestic constitutions.193 The comments by both the East 
German government and the West German government gave an 
idea of what was at stake during the Cold War in the debate 
about rights and duties and reveals just how contentious the 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 8–9. 
 190. On the influence of Pan-Africanism, see generally Brooke Coe, Regional 
Identities and Dynamic Normative Orders in the Global South: A Comparative 
Study (Sept. 2015) (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University 
of Minnesota) (on file with author) (comparing the evolution of sovereignty in 
the global south). 
 191. See African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 
34, at 9–12. 
 192. DAES, supra note 62, at 53. 
 193. See id. at 21–31. 
228 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1 
issue was. The East German government (German Democratic 
Republic) wrote: “The concept of citizen’s basic rights in the 
German Democratic Republic and the way in which those rights 
are put into effect are determined by the desire of the socialist 
State and socialist order to give individuals full scope to develop 
into socialist personalities, it being understood in this context 
that citizens’ basic rights are inseparably linked with their basic 
duties to the community.”194 The West German government, in 
contrast, expressed concern that such an understanding of rights 
and duties would undermine respect for human rights at a 
fundamental level: 
The state and the community, with their inherent 
monopoly of power, can protect themselves against 
dereliction of duty and abuses of law by individual 
citizens. For this reason, the rights of the community vis-
à-vis the individual and the individual’s duties 
corresponding to these rights do not need to be protected 
and given institutionalized safeguards in the same way 
as human rights.195  
In the context of the Cold War, with the shadow of fascism 
in the not-too-distant past, countries like West Germany feared 
that naming individual duties to the community would permit 
states to use an individual’s failure to perform duties as a 
justification for denying rights. These fears were not unfounded. 
In fact, in the same UN report, the Soviet Union plainly referred 
to duties as a “precondition” for the enjoyment of human 
rights.196 
Perhaps for this reason, initiatives to codify responsibilities 
were delayed until the post-Cold War era. In 1997, a year before 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, an organization of elite statesmen from around the world 
called the InterAction Council proposed a new international 
agreement: The Draft Declaration of Human Responsibilities.197 
Designed both to commemorate and to complement the UDHR, 
the draft document called for a shared “global ethic” that 
balances the rights of individuals with basic human 
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responsibilities.198 While many of the document’s signers were 
leaders from Europe and North America, by no means did they 
constitute a homogeneous clique. Some members, such as Jimmy 
Carter and Oscar Arias Sánchez, were Nobel Peace Prize 
winners and pillars of the international human rights 
movement. Others, like Michael Gorbachev, Helmut Schmidt, 
and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, stood at the helm of traditional 
European powers. The list also included leaders from smaller 
states, such as Lee Kuan Yew, the former premier of Singapore 
who famously prioritized efficient governance, economic growth, 
and a concern for “Asian Values” above universal human 
rights.199 Even Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara, two of 
the Cold War’s most prominent realists, signed on as supporters 
of the initiative, along with an array of other leaders 
representing academia, international organizations, and NGOs. 
Despite diversity in backgrounds and ideologies, the backers of 
the declaration agreed on an unambiguous, if ambitious, 
premise: “[All] people, to the best of their knowledge and ability, 
have a responsibility to foster a better social order, both at home 
and globally.”200 Noting that an over-emphasis on rights could 
lead to “conflict, division and endless dispute”201 the draft 
declaration called for all people to acknowledge the need for 
responsibilities, and then outlined specific obligations. 
The proposed Declaration of Human Responsibilities failed 
to make an impact. Rather than complementing the UDHR as 
envisioned, the document unleashed a barrage of criticism from 
almost every conceivable sector. Legal scholars argued that 
individuals already possessed obligations, which, though 
implied, were firmly established by international law, making 
the declaration superfluous and vague at best.202 Feminist 
scholars saw patriarchal motivations behind the call to balance 
rights and responsibilities, particularly in its insistence on 
family and domestic responsibilities.203 Amnesty International 
alleged that the declaration would “muddy” the understanding 
of universal human rights, and raised the possibility that the 
document could provide cover to authoritarian regimes in 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Sen, supra note 29, at 33–34. 
 200. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 201. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 202. See Saul, supra note 19, at 572. 
 203. SIOBHÁN MULLALLY, GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
RECLAIMING UNIVERSALISM 8 (Colin Harvey ed., 2006). 
230 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1 
denying their citizens basic rights.204 Perhaps critics even saw 
the document as emblematic of a nascent and problematic 
“responsibilities movement” in international human rights 
law.205 In response to these calls for greater emphasis on 
obligations, the United Nations General Assembly passed the 
“Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect 
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.”206 This document, however, does not pick up the 
standard of individual responsibility in human rights law. 
Instead, the General Assembly’s resolution reinforces the 
traditional view that the duty to respect or to promote human 
rights lies solely with states.207 The “human responsibilities 
movement” proved to be less of a threat to the traditional human 
rights regime than scholars and activists feared at the time. 
IV. DATA ON INDIVIDUAL DUTIES IN NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 
As noted earlier, duties talk has largely been supplanted by 
references to responsibilities with human rights. The chart 
below, taken from Google’s N-Gram database, illustrates the 
simultaneous proliferation of rights talk, the long slow decline of 
duties language, and the relatively recent but steady growth of 
responsibilities: 
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N-Gram for Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities 
1800-2008.208 
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Despite these historical trends, and the failure of duties to 
be explicitly incorporated into the UDHR, the rights and duties 
concept did not die out: it found its expression in national 
constitutions rather than in international treaties. The seeming 
contradiction, a dearth of responsibilities language in 
international human rights treaties alongside a wealth of 
responsibilities in global constitutions, is illustrative of the 
distinct traditions that make up the global discourse on human 
rights. Using data from the CCP,209 we analyzed the frequency 
and content of individual duties and found that the rights and 
duties concept has been resilient over time and across regions.210 
Duties of individuals have become a standard part of 
constitutional repertoire, particularly in nations outside the 
American and British common law tradition. By examining 
duties in national constitutions systematically, we aimed to 
assess the frequency and geographic concentration of individual 
duties in national constitutions as well as the diffusion of the 
duties over time and space.211 Constitutions vary considerably in 
structure, style, and specificity. A single duty can be referred to 
using different language, even though it conveys the same basic 
obligation for individuals. Therefore, working inductively, we 
grouped the particular articles found in global constitutions by 
topic, creating 27 separate individual duty categories (duty to 
vote, duty to defend the nation, etc.). Coding duties provisions 
was not always straightforward. As noted earlier, obligations 
may not be stated explicitly to be legally binding, or, they may 
be expressed in synonymous terms (“citizens must” versus 
“citizens have the duty”). For consistency, our study only counts 
explicit mentions of “duty” or “obligation” of citizens that 
appears within an article of a written constitution.212 
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After conducting this analysis, we find that duties are a 
truly global phenomenon; almost two-thirds of all independent 
states (62%) feature at least one duty of individual citizens. As 
one would expect, vertical duties that individuals owe to the 
state, such as the duty to pay taxes or perform military service, 
are among the most common duties (see chart below). But other 
duties, horizontal duties to protect the environment (33% of 
constitutions), work (20%), and care for and educate children 
(27%) also rank among the most common of all duties. 
We have derived two clear findings from the descriptive data 
on duties in constitutions. The first is that duties are especially 
common in Latin American nations. They have, on average, 5.95 
duties per constitution, whereas non-Latin American countries 
have on average 3.9 duties in their constitutions. The second 
finding is that there is a strong difference between the former 
colonies of the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. The 
United Kingdom itself does not have a written constitution, but 
no former British colony (including the United States) features 
a duty of the individual in its constitution. We do not yet know 
whether this is a result of common law legal systems or is due to 
some other feature of the British tradition. 
Recent scholarship on the diffusion of human rights norms 
has established a clear link between the provisions in 
international agreements and those in national constitutions. 
Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Beth Simmons found that 
the drafters of national constitutions borrow from the repertoire 
of human rights provisions established by international 
agreements, and that once established, these rights provisions 
tend to be durable over time—once a provision is included in the 
“menu of rights”, it tends not to disappear.213 But unlike what 
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Simmons find in the case of human rights 
provisions, the prevalence of duties in constitutions has not 
diffused downward from international human rights 
instruments.214 Nor have duties diffused in the other direction—
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from constitutions into international human rights law—
because, with the exception of the American Declaration and the 
African Charter, international human rights instruments have 
not included any detailed enumeration of individual duties. It 
does appear likely that language in constitutions has diffused 
horizontally from one constitution to another; in the case of 
duties to the environment, for example, a number of 
constitutions have quite similar language, suggesting that they 
borrowed phrasing from other constitutions, and from 
international declarations such as the Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration).215 It is not our purpose here to provide an account 
of what factors lead to the adoption of individual duties in 
constitutions. Rather, we have used this data to map the overall 
spread of the idea of individual duties to help refine our typology 
and theoretical understanding of individual responsibilities in 
human rights thinking. 
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Analyzing the CCP Data: 
Number of Constitutions Containing the Most 
Common Individual Duties 
Duty Provision   Number of Constitutions 
Defend sovereignty 83 
Obey the laws 66 
Protect environment and natural resources 64 
Pay taxes 53 
Educate and raise children  52 
Serve the nation (military or civilian service) 45 
Work 39 
Respect the rights of others  38 
Protect national heritage and culture 26 
Protect property 26 
Receive education 21 
Assist parents and the elderly 21 
Work toward the common good 20 
Promote national unity 19 
Respect national symbols and values 18 
Vote 17 
Other  16 
Cooperate with authorities to uphold laws 16 
Fulfill professional obligations 15 
Owe allegiance to the nation 15 
Participate in public life 12 
Promote health 12 
Protect peace, democracy, and social justice 11 
Protect the rights of children and family 9 
Recognize duties and responsibilities 9 
Promote education 5 
Promote human rights 3 
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V. FROM DUTY TO RESPONSIBILITY: DUTIES AND 
THE RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT 
What is at stake when we debate duties? For some human 
rights advocates, any kind of talk about individual duties raises 
the specter of repressive statism and limitations on individual 
liberty. These fears have existed from the founding moments of 
the contemporary human rights system, as when Malik, the 
Lebanese delegate to the UDHR Drafting Committee, 
questioned the idea of duties to the state because the greatest 
threat to individual rights was often the state itself. 
Even contemporary thinkers, who are sympathetic to 
cosmopolitan ethics in general, express skepticism about 
individualized obligations to promote human rights.216 In the 
context of the 21st century, however, where attention has tipped 
decidedly in favor of rights, we may be able to rediscover an older 
understanding of individual human duties as explicitly 
complementary to human rights to address pressing global 
problems. In doing so, we recognize that the linking of rights and 
duties is a deeply-rooted principle in the history of human rights. 
Among the traditions we discuss here, rights and duties are not 
two separate concepts, but rather a single interconnected 
concept that may be thought of as a rights and duties concept. 
Importantly, the concept of coupling rights and duties 
displays the agency of norm entrepreneurs from the Global 
South, illustrating how universal concepts of rights can exist in 
harmony with local political traditions and philosophies. These 
Southern norm entrepreneurs, especially those from Latin 
America in the late 1940s, revived the rights and duties model. 
Some suggest that it was Catholic social doctrine that led to the 
emphasis on duties in the Americas, borrowing from encyclicals 
such as the Rerum Novarum—the foundational document of 
contemporary social justice in the Catholic Church.217 We argue 
that attention to duties comes from a more diverse set of 
philosophical traditions in the region, and therefore, represents 
a kind of compromise between those who only wish to emphasize 
the rights of individuals against society and those who view 
society as an organic whole. In this way, duties of individuals 
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offer an example of a kind of hybrid model of international 
human rights that emerged when actors on the semi-periphery 
of the world system appropriated and redeployed legal and 
theoretical concepts of the Global North.218 
Scholars of international law often argue that universal 
human rights ideas are imposed on the international community 
by powerful states seeking to create institutions favorable to 
their interests.219 Other scholars have critiqued the tainted 
origins of human rights in Western, liberal, and secular thought 
by arguing that Universalist rhetoric of human rights can crowd 
out other local strategies or vocabularies that promote human 
dignity.220 Still others have proposed that human rights 
represent the latest version of the European mission 
civilisatrice, a secular religion serving the needs of Western 
governments by taking advantage of vulnerable people.221 
Historians have similarly critiqued commonly accepted 
narratives of the development of human rights. Notably, Sam 
Moyn has argued that origins of human rights ideals are less 
universal and more recent than most historians of the subject 
would like to admit.222 Taken together, these critiques have 
highlighted the contingent, contested, and socially-constructed 
nature of the rights themselves. Yet, our investigation into 
duties suggests that critiques of rights may, ironically, overlook 
the intellectual contributions of actors from the Global South, 
which sought to balance individualism and collectivism. 
The discussion of the position of duties in the American 
Declaration helps illustrate how, even when assimilating and 
articulating Enlightenment ideals about universal rights and 
duties, Latin American states and their representatives offer 
alternate interpretations of those concepts; ones that offer 
possibilities for strengthening the moral legitimacy of 
international human rights.223 Southern protagonism arguably 
increases the legitimacy of global governance projects, including 
the human rights and duties project. Amitav Acharya, for 
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example, critiques the study of normative change because it 
ignores the appeal of local and regional norms and because it 
fails to recognize the agency of local and regional actors. Acharya 
then developed the concept of norm ‘localization;’ a process 
through which local actors actively reconstruct global norms to 
create a fit between those norms and prior local norms.224 
Acharya’s concept of norm localization is related to the concept 
of norm “vernacularization,” which was proposed by 
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry. Merry points to social 
movements as human rights intermediaries that help 
vernacularize international human rights discourses,225 
meaning that they negotiate between “the language of 
international human rights preferred by international 
donors . . . and cultural terms that will be acceptable to at least 
some of the local community.”226 
This linking of individual rights and duties by norm 
entrepreneurs in the Global South has been largely overlooked, 
or mentioned only as an artifact of regional thinking. Revisiting 
the history of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights 
offers historical insights into the development of thinking about 
human rights and duties in the mid-twentieth century. Both of 
these cases suggest that the topic of individual rights and duties 
can provide insight into the way norms can be shaped, shared, 
and adapted by States on the periphery or semi-periphery of the 
international legal system. 
A brief examination of the duty to protect the environment 
reveals an illustrative example of norm localization at work. The 
Comparative Constitutions data reveals that the Right to 
Environment is both one of the most common and more recent 
individual duties in world constitutions. Many constitutions 
written since 1990 are likely to include a duty to protect the 
environment. Countries from every region of the world include 
the duty to protect or preserve the environment, including 
twenty from African countries, thirteen from European 
countries, eight from Asian countries, and three from Middle 
 
 224. See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm 
Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239, 
241 (2004); see also Amitav Acharya, Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: 
Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World, 55 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 95, 97 (2011). 
 225. See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local 
Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N. 38, 39 (2006). 
 226. Id. at 42. 
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Eastern countries. We see that this duty is not associated with 
any particular religion, as many countries from a wide range of 
religious traditions are represented among those with 
constitutions that include the duty to protect or preserve the 
environment. The table below presents a range of different ways 
that the duty to the environment is phrased in a selection of 
different constitutions from around the world. We see that the 
right to live in a healthy environment is often mentioned in the 
same article, and even in the same sentence with the duty to 
defend and protect it. 
Selected language from constitutions with a right 
to a healthy environment:  
Country and 
Year of 
Constitution 
Phrasing 
Angola (2010) “Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and 
unpolluted environment and the duty to defend 
and preserve it.”227 
Bhutan 
(2008) 
“Every Bhutanese is a trustee of the Kingdom’s 
natural resources and environment for the 
benefit of the present and future generations 
and it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to 
contribute to the protection of the natural 
environment, conservation of the rich 
biodiversity of Bhutan and prevention of all 
forms of ecological degradation including noise, 
visual and physical pollution through the 
adoption and support of environment friendly 
practices and policies.”228 
Bolivia (2009) “The duties of Bolivians are . . . to protect and 
defend the natural resources, and to contribute 
to their sustainable use in order to preserve the 
rights of future generations . . . .to protect and 
defend an environment suitable for the 
development of living beings.”229 
 
 227. ANGOLA [CONSTITUTION] 2010, art. 39. 
 228. BHUTAN [CONSTITUTION] 2008, art. 5. 
 229. BOLIVIA [CONSTITUTION] 2009, art. 108. 
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Brazil (1988) “Everyone has the right to an ecologically 
balanced environment, which is a public good for 
the people’s use and is essential for a healthy 
life. The Government and the community have a 
duty to defend and to preserve the environment 
for present and future generations.”230 
Burkina Faso 
(1991) 
“The right to a healthy environment is 
recognized; the protection, the defense and the 
promotion of the environment are a duty for 
all.”231 
Cape Verde 
(1980) 
“Everyone shall have the right to a healthy, 
ecologically balanced environment, and the duty 
to defend and conserve it.”232 
Colombia 
(1991) 
“The following are duties of the individual and of 
the citizen . . . to protect the country’s cultural 
and natural resources and to keep watch that a 
healthy environment is being preserved.”233 
Côte d’Ivoire 
(2000) 
“The protection of the environment and the 
promotion of the quality of life are a duty for the 
community and for each physical or moral 
person.”234 
Cuba (1976) “It is the duty of the citizens to contribute to the 
protection of the water and the atmosphere, and 
to the conservation of the soil, flora, fauna, and 
all the rich potential of nature.”235 
Egypt (2014) “Every individual has the right to live in a 
healthy, sound and balanced environment. Its 
protection is a national duty.”236 
Estonia 
(1992) 
“Everyone has a duty to preserve the human and 
natural environment and to compensate for 
damage caused to the environment by him or 
her.”237 
 
 230. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] 2009 art. 225 (Braz.). 
 231. BURKINA FASO [CONSTITUTION] 1991, rev. 2012, art. 29. 
 232. CAPE VERDE [CONSTITUTION] 1980, rev. 1992, art. 70. 
 233. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] 1991 art. 3. 
 234. CÔTE D’IVOIRE [CONSTITUTION] 2000, art. 28. 
 235. CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1976, rev. 2002, art. 27. 
 236. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 46. 
 237. ESTONIA [CONSTITUTION] 1992, rev. 2011, art. 53. 
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Gambia 
(1996) 
“The exercise and enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms are inseparable from the performance 
of duties and obligations, and accordingly, every 
citizen shall . . . protect and conserve the 
environment of The Gambia.”238 
Hungary 
(2011) 
“Natural resources, in particular arable land, 
forests and the reserves of water, biodiversity, in 
particular native plant and animal species, as 
well as cultural assets shall form the common 
heritage of the nation; it shall be the obligation 
of the State and everyone to protect and 
maintain them, and to preserve them for future 
generations.”239 
Panama 
(1972) 
“The State, and all the inhabitants of the 
national territory, have the obligation of 
promoting economic and social development that 
prevents environmental contamination, 
maintains ecological balance, and avoids the 
destruction of ecosystems.”240 
Poland (1997) “Everyone shall care for the quality of the 
environment and shall be held responsible for 
causing its degradation.”241 
Somalia 
(2012) 
“All people in the Federal Republic of Somalia 
have a duty to safeguard and enhance the 
environment and participate in the 
development, execution, management, 
conservation and protection of the natural 
resources and environment.”242 
Sri Lanka 
(1978) 
“The exercise and enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms are inseparable from the performance 
of duties and obligations and accordingly it is the 
duty of every person in Sri Lanka . . . to protect 
nature and conserve its riches.”243 
 
 238. GAMBIA [CONSTITUTION] 1996, rev. 2004, art. 220. 
 239. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF 
HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY. art. P. 
 240. PANAMA [CONSTITUTION] 1972, rev. 2004, art. 119. 
 241. POLAND [CONSTITUTION] 1997, rev. 2009, art. 86. 
 242. SOMALIA [CONSTITUTION] 2012, art. 45. 
 243. SRI LANKA [CONSTITUTION] 1978, rev. 2015, art. 28. 
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Timor-Leste 
(2002) 
“All have the right to a humane, healthy, and 
ecologically balanced environment and the duty 
to protect it and improve it for the benefit of the 
future generations.”244 
Turkey (1982) “It is the duty of the State and citizens to 
improve the natural environment, to protect the 
environmental health and to prevent 
environmental pollution.”245 
Ukraine 
(1996) 
“Everyone is obliged not to harm nature, 
cultural heritage and to compensate for any 
damage he or she inflicted.”246 
Vanuatu 
(1980) 
“Every person has the following fundamental 
duties to himself and his descendants and to 
others . . . to safeguard the national wealth, 
resources and environment in the interests of 
the present generation and of future 
generations.”247 
Venezuela 
(1999) 
“It is the right and duty of each generation to 
protect and maintain the environment for its 
own benefit and that of the world of the 
future.”248 
Yemen (1991) “Each individual shall have a religious and 
national duty to protect the environment.”249 
 
We argue that combined attention to rights and duties of 
individuals has a long pedigree that includes important 
contributions of Latin American and African diplomats and legal 
scholars. We also establish that individual duties, although 
infrequent in international human rights law, are very 
prominent in national constitutions and are often interspersed 
with rights-related language. One reason that duties are not 
well established in human rights law or discourse is because 
diplomats, scholars, and activists cogently critique individual 
duties on normative and political grounds. 
 
 244. TIMOR-LESTE [CONSTITUTION] 2002, art. 61. 
 245. TURKEY [CONSTITUTION] 1982, rev. 2011, art. 56. 
 246. UKRAINE [CONSTITUTION] 1996, rev. 2014, art. 66. 
 247. VANUATU [CONSTITUTION] 1980, rev. 1983, art. 7. 
 248. BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION] 1999, rev. 2009, 
art. 127. 
 249. YEMEN [CONSTITUTION] 1991, rev. 2001, art. 35. 
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Today, there is a resurgence of the talk of duties and 
responsibilities, but most discussion focuses on the duties of 
international institutions.250 Seen in this way, the primary 
challenge is to reform our global institutions, whether they be 
the World Trade Organization or the United Nations Security 
Council. Legal experts who propose to build a more diverse duty-
bearer regime tend to be most concerned about expanding duty-
bearers to include international organizations, transnational 
corporations, and non-state actors such as insurgent groups, 
rather than stressing the duties of individuals.251 We support 
these efforts, but believe that this more diverse regime should 
include individual obligations. Attention to individual 
responsibilities need not detract from the significant project of 
ensuring that global institutions collectively promote the basic 
human rights of the poor and the socially marginal. 
The situation in the first part of the 21st century is quite 
different from that of 1948. Today, there is a dense body of 
international human rights law that spells out a wide range of 
rights and puts in place a growing set of institutions designed to 
implement, and occasionally enforce, such rights. This does not 
mean that rights are being fully or universally enjoyed—far from 
it. Still, it suggests that in the task of promoting rights, it may 
be useful to move beyond the obvious and important duties of the 
state and the newer and important responsibilities of 
international organizations and corporations to reconsider the 
horizontal duties of individuals to other individuals and to 
society, including international society.252 Such duties can be 
important ways to supplement or complement state duties and 
enhance the respect for rights. 
In particular, we wish to draw attention to the duties that 
individuals have to protect the environment and to respect and 
promote the rights of other individuals. There are many duties 
listed in constitutions, but the most important in our minds are 
the ones that stress the duties of individuals to protect the 
environment and to respect the rights of others. As such, we 
argue that more attention to these kinds of duties may help 
 
 250. See Pogge, supra note 36, at 64. 
 251. See also Steven Ratner Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of 
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); see generally van Genugten, 
supra note 49 (exploring the human rights legal regime with respect to different 
duty-bearers in changing times). 
 252. On responsibilities of corporations for human rights practices, see 
Ratner, supra, note 251. 
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enhance human rights rather than subvert them. Stressing 
duties as useful complements to human rights could be an 
essential tool to address global public policy challenges, 
especially on issues related to global climate change where 
emphasizing rights is unlikely to help advance the issue unless 
an entire network of duty-holders is also mobilized. 
We argue that part of the dismissal of duties stems from the 
way they are framed or located in political thought. Because 
many associate duties with conservatism, religion, 
authoritarianism, and communitarianism, they may feel that 
attention to duties will necessarily imperil rights. There are good 
reasons to be skeptical when states, such as Russia with its 
troubled records of compliance, present resolutions in the 
Human Rights Council about “traditional values of humankind” 
as a vehicle for promoting human rights. Moreover, there is 
concern when Islamic states say that the right to free speech 
should be limited by a duty not to blaspheme. However, we 
believe it is possible, and even necessary, to come from a strong 
human rights perspective and speak about the importance of 
individual duties—especially those duties that involve 
protecting the environment and respecting or promoting the 
rights of others. In doing so, we hope to echo ideas described by 
Martha Nussbaum and others as the capabilities approach, 
which stress the full flourishing of the human person in harmony 
with her environment.253 Again, this view requires stressing the 
relational quality of human rights while concurrently stressing 
the inherent dignity of the individual. 
We do not argue that new human rights treaties should be 
written that incorporate explicit articles about individual duties. 
Instead, we recognize that rights are always relational and thus 
rights and duties always coexist. Nevertheless, within this 
existing framework of human rights law, much more can be done 
to highlight not just our individual rights, but also our individual 
duties to protect rights. We call for a more in-depth awareness 
and application of the words in the common preamble to both the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR: “Realizing that the individual, having 
duties to other individuals and to the community to which he 
 
 253. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social 
Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992) 
(examining the realm of essentialism in the context of moral and non-moral 
human functioning). 
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belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”254 
Much more can be done to highlight that protecting rights 
is a long-term project involving partnerships between states, 
international institutions, civil society, and individuals. In these 
partnerships, all sides have complementary duties and 
responsibilities to promote rights. Duties and rights do not need 
to come into conflict with one another, but can mutually 
reinforce one another. Our proposal is not to rewrite the law, but 
to rediscover the history of rights and duties, and thus use it to 
build new constituencies for combined attention to rights and 
duties with the goal of addressing the world’s most pressing 
needs. 
 
 254. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra 
note 176, pmbl. (1966). 
